This study aims to verify the usefulness of the tax avoidance proxy developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
INTRODUCTION
ook income based on accounting standards is the most widely used summary measure of a firm's financial performance by market participants in debt covenants, compensation contracts, and stock market pricing. Taxable income, as determined by tax rules, is used to calculate the amount of taxes to be paid to the tax authorities. Therefore, firms have two incentives: to report higher book income for financial reporting purposes and to report lower taxable income for tax reporting purposes. When firms report increased book income and/or decreased taxable income, the difference between them becomes evident. A large body of literature from the U.S. has provided evidence that the book-tax difference reflects earnings management and/or tax avoidance (Lev and Nissim 2004; Phillips et al. 2003; Hanlon 2005; Mills 1998; Manzon and Plesko 2002; Desai 2003) . Based on the results of these studies, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a proxy of tax avoidance measured by the residual of the book-tax difference that cannot be explained by earnings management.
In this environment, items with high book-tax conformity are the only opportunistic and primary tools for firms to avoid paying taxes. For example, firms may manage the accruals with high book-tax conformity ("book-tax accruals", hereafter) downward in an attempt to reduce taxable income.
1 However, downward management of booktax accruals affects both book income and taxable income negatively. Thus, firms may adjust accruals with low book-tax conformity ("book-only accruals", hereafter) upward to compensate for the increased financial reporting costs without affecting taxable income (Calegari 2000) . 2 In cases where book-tax accruals are primarily used for tax reporting purposes, the proxy developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) ("tax avoidance proxy", hereafter) may not be a good indicator of tax avoidance because it is not expected to detect tax avoidance activities that do not affect the gap between book and taxable income. On the other hand, if firms use book-only accruals to compensate for the reduction in book income due to management of booktax accruals, the tax avoidance proxy may detect upward management of book-only accruals, which generates a book-tax difference. However, management of book-only accruals may not be captured by the tax avoidance proxy because book-only accruals is a component of total accruals, and total accruals is excluded from the book-tax difference in computation of the tax avoidance proxy. This empirical question as to whether the tax avoidance proxy captures accruals management requires investigation. Therefore, I test the ability of the proxy to detect management of book-tax and book-only accruals. I also test whether the tax avoidance proxy better detects the simultaneous management of the two accrual components (downward management of book-tax accruals and upward management of book-only accruals) than management of book-tax accruals alone. In addition, firms have incentives to manage both accrual components at the same time when both financial reporting costs and tax costs are high. Thus, I examine whether the proxy is more powerful in detecting tax avoidance activities in a sample of firms with high tax and financial reporting costs than in firms that carry high tax costs, but low financial reporting costs.
To test my hypotheses, I investigate a large set of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange during the period between 2000 and 2013. My findings show that the tax avoidance proxy does not capture downward management of book-tax accruals; however, it is positively associated with upward management of book-only accruals. This implies that the tax avoidance proxy is not suitable for firms that cannot opportunistically use tax planning resulting in a book-tax difference. In addition, they provide the evidence that the tax avoidance proxy cannot exclude the effect of earnings management via book-only accruals.
I also find that the tax avoidance proxy better detects simultaneous management of the two accrual components than management of book-tax accruals alone. In addition, by assessing the firm's tax and financial reporting costs using the previous year's taxable income and debt ratio, respectively, I find that firms with high tax and financial reporting costs show higher levels of tax avoidance than firms with high tax costs and low financial reporting costs. These results imply that the proxy can still be effective in measuring tax avoidance in firms that have concerns about increased financial reporting costs due to tax avoidance activities.
The results of this study provide additional insight into previous findings in tax avoidance and earnings management research. First, this study sheds light on the usefulness of the tax avoidance proxy developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) in the distinctive setting where book-tax conformity is high and aggressive tax planning is restricted. The findings provide a caveat to researchers that the level of tax avoidance can be erroneously measured by the employment of the proxy without considering the distinctive characteristics of the accounting and tax environment. Second, the management of book-only accruals, which can be considered as earnings management, should not be overlooked when investigating tax avoidance activities. Lastly, more attention should be paid to tax avoidance activities that do not result in a book-tax difference when analyzing firms with high book-tax conformity.
I believe that the results of this study are meaningful not only for researchers, but also for users of financial information, auditors, and regulators who are interested in tax avoidance activity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes previous research in this area and lays out the hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the research method and the model used to prove the hypotheses. Empirical evidence is provided in Section 4. In section 5, I summarize and conclude.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Previous Research
The book-tax difference has been extensively examined by various researchers. The literature can be classified into two categories. Many studies attempt to explain the book-tax difference by focusing on earnings management or earnings quality. Other studies attempt to explain the book-tax difference by focusing on tax avoidance. Lev and Nissim (2004) investigate the relation between the ratio of taxable to book income and future earnings growth and show that a higher book-tax difference is related to lower future earnings growth because the book-tax difference reflects earnings management activities that are not persistent. Hanlon (2005) also finds that firms with large positive book-tax differences have lower earnings persistence than firms with small book-tax differences. He also finds that investors interpret large book-tax differences as a bad sign (referred to as a "red flag" in his study), reducing their expectations of future earnings persistence accordingly.
On the other hand, Mills (1998) shows that a large book-tax difference increases the likelihood of IRS audit and adjustment. He finds a correlation between the book-tax difference and tax avoidance. Manzon and Plesko (2002) also report that a few measures approximating the demand for tax shelters help explain the book-tax difference. Desai (2003) also provides evidence that the book-tax difference is related to tax avoidance. He traces the growing the book-tax difference associated with differential treatments of depreciation and other factors. He finds that more than half of book-tax difference cannot be accounted for by those factors.
Based on the results of the above studies, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a measure of tax avoidance by controlling for the component attributable to earnings management activity. They regress the book-tax difference on total accruals by assuming that any difference not explained by earnings management can be interpreted as a measure of tax avoidance. They interpret the residual book-tax difference as a more precise measure of tax sheltering activity; this method has been widely used in studies of tax avoidance.
On the other hand, some studies investigate tax avoidance by focusing on accounting choices that do not lead to a book-tax difference. Jenkins and Pincus (1998) find that firms adopt a LIFO strategy in inventory accounting in order to save on taxes. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) investigate whether firms shift income across time periods in response to the United States Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 86", hereafter), which reduced the corporate tax rate from a maximum of 46% to 34% over a period of two years. They find that firms shift some portion of their gross margin from the preceding quarters to quarters of scheduled tax rate reduction to reduce taxes. Guenther (1994) focuses on discretionary accruals that are expected to affect taxable income. He finds reduced discretionary accruals in the year prior to the passage of TRA 86 in many firms. Calegari (2000) extends the research of prior studies by dividing accruals into two different types depending on whether or not they affect taxable income. He defines accruals with high book-tax conformity as book-tax accruals and finds that firms with increased marginal tax rates due to TRA 86 adjust their book-tax accruals downward for tax avoidance purposes. In addition, he defines accruals with low book-tax conformity as book-only accruals and finds simultaneous adjustment of book-only accruals upward to accomplish financial reporting objectives. In Korea, Choi and Lee (2013) also divide accruals into two components, investigating adjustment of these two components in response to tax rate reductions. They find that firms manage book-tax accruals in order to shift taxable income and manage book-only accruals in order to compensate for the commensurate reduction in book income in response to tax rate reductions.
In sum, tax avoidance activities can be classified into two types -tax avoidance that causes book-tax differences and tax avoidance that does not. Although the proxy of Desai and Dharmapala (2006) was developed to measure the former type of tax avoidance activity, it has been widely used without discrimination between these two types. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate the usefulness of this tax avoidance proxy in the unique setting where firms are likely to avoid taxes without generating book-tax differences. This study aims to identify at what point the proxy becomes a more precise measure of tax avoidance.
Hypotheses Development
Book-tax differences in Korea are relatively lower than that of the U.S. Specifically, the average ratio of book income to taxable income in the U.S. is in the range of 1.4-1.7, while in Korea, it is in the range of 0.9-1.1 (Mills and Plesko 2003; Choi et al. 2009 ). The relatively lower book-tax difference in Korea is mostly due to differences in the treatment of allowances and the depreciation in accounting standards and tax laws. First, in Korea, allowances are tax deductible as long as they are within the limit specified by tax laws; by contrast, they are not tax deductible at all in the U.S. Second, many U.S. firms use straight line depreciation for book purposes and accelerated depreciation for tax purposes, but Korean firms usually use the same depreciation methods and useful life measures for both book and tax purposes. In addition, there are a less number of multinational firms that opportunistically utilize the aggressive tax planning through as tax havens or transfer pricing in Korea than in the U.S (Choi and Lee 2013) .
Therefore, Korean firms that attempt to avoid paying taxes do not have many options; thus, they are highly likely to manage items with high book-tax conformity. Accruals with high book-tax conformity are the representative and primary tools for tax avoidance in Korea. However, managing book-tax accruals decreases book income as well as taxable income, not resulting in the gap between book and taxable income. Accordingly, the management of booktax accruals for tax planning may not be detected by the proxy developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) , which measures tax sheltering activity by the residual of the book-tax difference that cannot be explained by earnings management.
When firms manage taxable income downward through book-tax accruals, they may also utilize book-only accruals to increase the book income, which is otherwise decreased along with taxable income. Strictly speaking, management of book-only accruals can be considered as earnings management, but it may be detected by tax avoidance proxy since it generates book-tax difference and is likely to be accompanied by tax avoidance. On the other hand, management of book-only accruals may not be captured by the tax avoidance proxy because the tax avoidance proxy is measured by disentangling total accruals from book-tax difference, and total accruals includes book-only accruals. Therefore, I am unable to ex ante predict a direction for the association between management of book-only accruals and tax avoidance proxy. To assess the usefulness of the tax avoidance proxy in detecting the management of these two accrual components empirically, the first hypothesis is therefore formulated as a null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Downward management of book-tax accruals and upward management of book-only accruals are not detected by the tax avoidance proxy.
This first hypothesis is set to investigate empirically the relationship between the tax avoidance proxy and the management of book-tax and book-only accruals. However, the first hypothesis includes the cases where book-only accruals are managed solely for financial reporting purposes. Since the focus of this study is on the accrual management related to tax avoidance, the second hypothesis analyzes the usefulness of the tax avoidance proxy to detect management of book-only accruals simultaneously managed with book-tax accruals.
Cases of tax avoidance can be classified into two types. Firms that belong to the first type simultaneously manage book-tax accruals downward and manage book-only accruals upward. Other firms manage book-tax accruals only downward because they are unconcerned about reduced book income. In the first case, a book-tax difference is generated, while in the second case, it is not. Since the tax avoidance proxy is created by focusing on the book-tax difference, it may be more useful for detection of the former type of tax avoidance than the latter type. However, if management of book-only accruals is not captured by the tax avoidance proxy, it may not have the ability to
The Tax Avoidance Proxy
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a tax avoidance measure by regressing the total book-tax difference (BTD) on total accruals. As a result, the component of BTD, which cannot be captured by earnings management, is interpreted as a tax sheltering activity. The residual of the following equation is used to represent the level of tax avoidance in this study.
BTD i,t : Book-tax difference for firm i in year t; and TA i,t : Total accruals for firm i in year t.
Model Specifications
I develop regression model (1) to test the relationships between the tax avoidance proxy and downward management of book-tax accruals and upward management of book-only accruals. The tax avoidance proxy (TAXAVOID) is a dependent variable and △DBTA and △DBOA are independent variables. Along with our variables of interest, we also include control variables that can influence a firm's tax avoidance. These factors include the firm size, leverage, profitability, cash flows, growth, and ownership structure.
The coefficient of △DBTA (β 1 ) is expected not to be statistically significant, as downward management of book-tax accruals does not affect the book-tax difference. By contrast, the coefficient of △DBOA (β 2 ) may be positive, as upward management of book-only accruals accompanies an increase in the book-tax difference. However, since the tax avoidance proxy is measured by the residual excluding the total accruals from the book-tax difference, β 2 may not be statistically significant if the tax avoidance proxy already controls for management of book-only accruals, which is a component of total accruals.
I develop the following regression model (3) to test the third hypothesis. Firms generally manage book-tax accruals and book-only accruals concurrently when both tax and financial reporting costs are high. This study measures tax and financial reporting costs using taxable income and the debt ratio in the previous year, respectively. 3 Since the current year's taxable income and debt ratio are already affected by the managers' accounting choices for tax planning, the values in the previous year are used as ex ante proxies of tax and financial reporting costs.
TAXFIN_D is a dummy variable which equals 1 if both the taxable income and debt ratio of the previous year are higher than those of the median, and 0 if they are lower than those of the median. 4 Firms with high tax and financial reporting costs have more incentives to choose a tax planning strategy that will generate a higher book-tax difference than those with high tax costs only. Hence, if the tax avoidance proxy captures the probability of a tax planning strategy to increase the book-tax difference, the coefficient of TAXFIN_D (β 1 ) is expected to have a positive value. However, the coefficient of TAXFIN_D (β 1 ) may not be statistically significant if the tax avoidance proxy is not unrelated to a tax planning strategy that generates a book-tax difference.
TAXFIN_D i,t : Dummy variable that equals 1 if scaled taxable income and leverage ratio in year t-1 are both higher than the median value, and 0 if scaled taxable income in year t-1 is higher than the median value, but debt ratio in year t-1 is lower than the median value.
Sample Selection
My initial sample consists of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange during the period between 2000 and 2013. Financial firms are excluded from the sample due to the unique nature of their financial data. Non-December yearend firms are also eliminated from the sample for homogeneity. Financial information, market value, and ownership data are gathered from the TS2000 (http://www.kokoinfo.com) and KIS-VALUE (http://www.kisline.com) databases. 5 I also eliminate firm-year observations less than 10 by industry and year because more than 10 observations are necessary to estimate the discretionary portion of book-tax and book-only accruals, using the modified Jones model. Next, I delete observations without △DBTA or △DBOA. Lastly, I exclude firm-year observations whose market value, largest shareholder's ownership, or foreign investors' ownership is not available TAXFIN_D has a mean value of 0.386, indicating that the percentage of firms with high tax and financial reporting costs simultaneously is about 38.6% of the sample (n = 2,875).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
For the control variables, the mean (median) values of firm size (SIZE) and return on assets (ROA) are 19.570 (19.302) and 0.025 (0.034), respectively. The ratio of debt to total assets in the sample firms is approximately 44.5%. The sample firms' growth rate (GROWTH) is about 7.4% and the mean (median) market-to-book ratio is 1.041 (0.731). The proportion of equity held by major shareholders is approximately 42%, and the proportion of equity held by foreign investors is about 9.6% on average. (2006)' s tax avoidance for firm i in year t; △DBTAi,t: Change in discretionary book-tax accruals; △DBOAi,t: Change in discretionary book-only accruals; COMP_Di,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if △DBTA is negative and △DBOA is positive, and 0 if △DBTA and △DBOA are both negative; TAXFIN_Di,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if scaled taxable income and leverage ratio in year t-1 are both higher than median value, and 0 if scaled taxable income in year t-1 is higher than the median value but leverage ratio in year t-1 is lower than the median value; SIZEi,t: Log of total assets; LEVi,t: Total liabilities divided by total assets; ROAi,t: Net income divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; CFOi,t: Cash flow from operations divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; GROWTHi,t: change in sales divided by previous year's sales; MTBi,t: Market value divided by equity; OWNi,t: Proportion of ownership held by the largest shareholder of the firms; and FORi,t: Proportion of ownership held by foreign investors of the firms. Column A of Table 3 presents the results of regression model (1), which tests the association between management of the two accrual components and the tax avoidance proxy. The coefficient of △DBTA is positive, but not statistically significant (t-statistic = 1.26, p-value = 0.208) , implying that the downward adjustment of book-tax accruals for tax reporting purposes is not detected by the tax avoidance proxy. On the other hand, △DBOA is positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 4.39, p-value < .0001), indicating that the upward adjustment of book-only accruals for financial reporting purposes is captured by the tax avoidance proxy. These results suggest that the proxy cannot completely exclude the possibility of accruals management, and therefore it should be used carefully and only after controlling for the adjustment of book-only accruals, which is not associated with corporate tax planning.
Regression Analysis
As a sensitivity test, I run the regression with level variables for book-tax and book-only accruals (DBTA and DBOA) instead of change variables (△DBTA and △DBOA). Column B of Table 3 shows that the coefficient of DBTA is not statistically significant, but that of DBOA is positively significant, which is consistent with the results of the main regression analysis.
1) *, **, *** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
2) The variables are defined as in Table 2 .
Column A of Table 4 presents the results of regression model (2), which tests hypothesis 2. The coefficient of COMP_D is positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.71, p-value = 0.007), implying that tax sheltering activity is better captured by the proxy when firms simultaneously manage both accrual components rather than when firms manage only book-tax accruals. This test provides evidence that the tax avoidance proxy is more useful in settings where firms manage book-only accruals along with book-tax accruals than in settings where firms manage only book-tax accruals for tax planning.
As a sensitivity test, I run regression model (2) with COMP_D1, an alternative measure of COMP_D. COMP_D1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if DBTA is lower than its median value and DBOA is higher than its median value, and 0 if DBTA and DBOA are both lower than their respective median values. Column B of Table 4 reports that the coefficient of COMP_D1 is also positive and statistically significant at p < 0.001, which is consistent with the results of the main regression analysis. 1) *, **, *** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
2) COMP_D1i,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if DBTA is lower than its median value and DBOA is higher than its median value, and 0 if DBTA and DBOA both are lower than their respective median values. The other variables are defined as in Table 2 . Table 5 presents the results of regression model (3), which tests hypothesis 3. The results show that the coefficient of TAXFIN_D is positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 4.15, p-value < .0001), which implies that the value of the tax avoidance proxy is higher for firms with both high tax costs and high financial reporting costs than for firms with high tax costs, but low financial reporting costs. This result can be interpreted as follows: the proxy is more powerful in detecting tax avoidance activity in a sample of firms with incentives to manage both accrual components simultaneously than in firms with incentives to manage only book-tax accruals.
Panel B of Table 5 reveals the results of regression (2) with TAXFIN_D1, an alternative measure of TAXFIN_D. TAXFIN_D1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the scaled taxable income and debt ratio in the year t-1 are both higher than their respective mean values, and 0 if the scaled taxable income in year t-1 is higher, but the debt ratio in year t-1 is lower than their respective mean values. The coefficient of TAXFIN_D1 is also positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 3.53, p-value = 0.000), thus supporting hypothesis 3. 1) *, **, *** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
2) TAXFIN_Di,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if scaled taxable income and leverage ratio in year t-1 are both higher than mean value, and 0 if scaled taxable income in year t-1 is higher than the mean value but leverage ratio in year t-1 is lower than the mean value. The other variables are defined as in Table 2 . Desai and Dharmapala (2006) propose a tax avoidance proxy estimated by the residual of the book-tax difference that is not captured by total accruals based on the assumption that the book-tax difference is attributable to tax avoidance and earnings management. However, Korea-based studies present mixed results as to whether the booktax difference reflects tax avoidance because in Korea, firms commonly attempt to avoid taxes using accruals with high tax conformity. Downward management of book-tax accruals leads to a decrease not only in taxable income, but also in book income, which does not result in a book-tax gap. Therefore, it is intuitive that for firms engaging in tax avoidance activity, when no book-tax gap is generated, the tax avoidance proxy fails to detect this activity. In addition, firms concerned about lower book income due to downward management of book-tax accruals may be inclined to compensate for reduced book income by upward managing book-only accruals while maintaining the same level of taxable income. It is an empirical question as to whether management of book-only accruals is captured by the tax avoidance proxy because it increases the book-tax difference; however, the tax avoidance proxy is developed to exclude the effect of earnings management via total accruals. In this empirical study, I verify the ability of the proxy developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) to detect firms' management of book-tax and bookonly accruals. I test my hypotheses by analyzing archival data on publicly-listed Korean firms during the period from 2000 to 2013.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study show that the tax avoidance proxy does not detect downward management of book-tax accruals, as expected earlier. In addition, the proxy is positively related to upward management of book-only
